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Self-Regulation through Goal Setting
*
 
Goals are an important source of motivation. But little is known about why and how people 
set them. We address these questions in a model based on two stylized facts from 
psychology and behavioral economics: i) Goals serve as reference points for performance. ii) 
Present-biased preferences create self-control problems. We show how goals permit self-
regulation, but also that they are painful self-disciplining devices. Greater self-control 
problems therefore lead to stronger self-regulation through goals only up to a certain point. 
For severely present-biased preferences, the required goal for self-regulation is too painful 
and the individual rather gives up. 
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Goals are a cornerstone of the human motivational system. While the role of goals has been
largely ignored by economists, psychologists have studied extensively the way in which goals
aﬀect task performance. According to Bandura, this research has shown that “the regulation
of motivation by goal setting is a remarkably robust phenomenon” (p.xii of his foreword to
Locke and Latham’s (1990a) survey of the psychology literature on goals). The typical study
takes goals as exogenously assigned and measures how such given goals aﬀect performance
in various tasks. However, little is known about why and how people set goals for them-
selves (see e.g. Bargh 1990, Carver and Scheier 1999, Oettingen, Pak, and Schnetter 2001).
We address these questions in a model based on two stylized facts from psychology and
behavioral economics: i) Goals serve as reference points for performance. ii) Present-biased
preferences create self-control problems. The contribution of our paper is to show how the
choice of goals can serve as an instrument for regulating own behavior, and how individu-
als will optimally choose such goals. We thereby also highlight the limits of self-regulation
through goal setting: because goals are painful self-disciplining devices, individuals with a
severe present bias may rationally choose not to set tough goals for themselves and rather
give up on self-regulation.
People often exhibit time-inconsistent preferences because they overemphasize immediate
costs or beneﬁts relative to more distant ones (e.g. Ainslie and Haslam 1992, Strotz 1955,
Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a). Such a present bias
means that an individual cannot trust the way he will behave in the future, and thus creates
a need for self-regulation. Suppose, for instance, a person ﬁnds working hard on a task
scheduled in a week’s time is the optimal thing to do, when weighing today the future cost
of eﬀort against the future beneﬁts from a higher task outcome. But once the date of the
task arrives, the person may then actually decide to shirk rather than work hard. Such a
preference reversal occurs because the costs of working hard become more salient when they
are immediate and now loom larger than the gains, which only accrue in the future. In other
words, the present bias creates an intrapersonal conﬂict of interest.1
If the person attempts to inﬂuence his future behavior by simply telling himself ‘to do his
best’ in a week’s time, then the future self will indeed choose the ‘best’ eﬀort level – namely,
to shirk. The problem is that what is best from the future self’s perspective is not what
today’s self ﬁnds optimal. Hence, setting a na¨ ıve ‘do-your-best’ goal is not a successful
self-regulation strategy. Consistent with this, Locke and Latham (1990a) conclude from
their review of 183 studies on goal setting that ‘do-your-best’ goals lead to low performance.
1There are other ways to model interpersonal conﬂicts and self-control problems: e.g., the “doer-planner
model” (Thaler and Shefrin 1981), the “dual self model” (Fudenberg and Levine 2006), or the “temptation
utility model” (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001).
2People may nevertheless specify such goals, as they are not fully aware of their self-control
problem – believing that their future selves have the same preferences over choices as they
have today.
In contrast, a sophisticated individual, who anticipates his self-control problem (see e.g.
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a) can attempt to regulate his future behavior. In line with
Baumeister and Heatherton’s (1996) notion that “without clear and consistent standards self-
regulation will be hampered”, we show how speciﬁc goals help such sophisticated individuals
exert control over future actions.
A key property of such goals is that they aﬀect individuals’ perceptions of future outcomes.
In their surveys of the large body of empirical research carried out by psychologists, Locke
and Latham state that “having a goal means to use it as a standard for evaluating one’s
performance” (1990a, p.78), and that “goals serve as the inﬂection point or reference standard
for satisfaction versus dissatisfaction [...] For any given trial, exceeding the goal provides
increasing satisfaction as the positive discrepancy grows, and not reaching the goal creates
increasing dissatisfaction as the negative discrepancy grows” (Locke and Latham 2002, p.709-
710). We take these stylized facts as starting points and model goals as reference points
against which actual task outcomes are measured, assuming that people display loss aversion
regarding goal achievement.2 Hence, the process of goal setting leads to an endogenous
reference point for task performance.3
We then show that setting a challenging goal for future performance makes future selves
strive harder: they become motivated by the fear of falling short of the goal. Thus, an
increase in the goal level set today allows an individual to raise his motivation to work hard
in the future, by increasing the psychological cost of shirking. This result is in line with Locke
and Latham’s (1990a) summary of evidence concerning the relationship between motivation
and (exogenously assigned) goal diﬃculty: “subjects with speciﬁc, hard goals exerted more
eﬀort than those with less-diﬃcult goals.” Our model derives formally their explanation that
“people with high goals produce more because they are dissatisﬁed with less. [...] This is
why they are motivated to do more than those with easy goals.”
This brings us then to our main question: How do people set goals for themselves? An
individual with a more severe present bias is more tempted to shirk. Thus, the greater the
present bias, the higher the goal that would be needed to motivate the future self – sug-
gesting a monotone relationship between the self-set goal and the present bias. However,
as our model shows, there are limits to self-regulation. The reason is that goals are painful
2Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) point out the similarity to the value function in Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) Prospect Theory, and present evidence supporting this view.
3See K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2006) for a diﬀerent approach to modeling endogenous reference points. In their
setting, the individual’s prior expectation about an outcome serves as the reference point. The idea that
goals serve as reference points, which are in part actively chosen by the individual, can also be found in Falk
and Knell (2004) (see below).
3self-disciplining devices. While a higher goal raises the motivation of a future self, it also
increases the chances of falling short of it and then suﬀering a psychological loss despite high
eﬀort. The process of goal setting hence trades-oﬀ anticipated psychological costs against
beneﬁts from self-regulation. The comparative statics of our model show that the optimal
goal is non-monotonically related to the severity of the individual’s present bias. For in-
termediate ranges of the present bias the individual compensates for a stronger bias with
a higher goal. If however the individual faces a severe present bias, the goal required to
sidestep the self-control problem becomes too painful. Such a person rationally gives up on
self-regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. We next discuss the related literature. Section 2 introduces
the model, which we analyze in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are in
the appendix.
Related Literature
Goals have mainly been studied by psychologists (see references above), and we are aware
of only one paper in the economics literature: Falk and Knell (2004) investigate in a social
comparison model how the motives of self-enhancement (people use comparisons with others
to make themselves feel better) and self-improvement (people use comparisons with others to
improve their own performance) aﬀect goal choice. The individual’s reference standard for his
personal outcome depends both on his chosen goal and the average outcome of others in the
comparison group. In contrast to our setting, the individual does not display loss aversion
regarding goal achievement. Instead, a higher goal lowers the costs of providing eﬀort.
Moreover, eﬀort and the ability of an individual are complements in the production function.
Falk and Knell show that the optimal goal is increasing in the ability of an individual –
implying that people compare themselves to similar others. Our study is complementary to
theirs as it highlights another important motivation for goal setting: the regulation of own
behavior when people face self-control problems.
We therefore link the literature on goals with the behavioral economics literature on time-
inconsistent preferences. Most closely related are theoretical contributions that deal with the
question how present-biased individuals cope with self-control problems (for an overview see
e.g. Brocas, Carrillo, and Dewatripont 2004). Much of this literature focuses on the role of
external commitment technologies for achieving precommitment (Elster 2000). For example,
people may invest in illiquid assets, or sign binding contracts in order to overcome self-
control problems in savings, consumption and retirement decisions (Laibson 1997, Diamond
and K¨ oszegi 2003, Carrillo 2005) or to overcome low eﬀort provision and procrastination
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999b, Della Vigna and Malmendier 2004, Carrillo and Dewatripont
42008).4 From this literature Carrillo and Dewatripont (2008) is most closely related to our
approach: they study how promises to other parties help overcome self-control problems. In
their setting, breaking a promise leads to costs from a loss in reputation or other sanctions
enforced by explicit contracts.5 As the model has no uncertainty about the performance
measure, making promises is costless if the individual takes the ‘right’ actions. Our setting
highlights that performance standards (whether internally or externally enforced) are costly
devices for disciplining a future self, because of the risk of falling short of the standard.
While most of the literature focuses on external commitment strategies, a few contributions
deal with intrapersonal strategies, as our paper. In a model where an individual has imperfect
recall about past motives, and hence draws inference about these motives based on past
actions (like living up to a personal rule), B´ enabou and Tirole (2004) can explain why people
do not abandon unpleasant personal rules, i.e. why internal commitment devices actually
work. In contrast, Benhabib and Bisin (2005) and Herweg and M¨ uller (2008) assume the
presence of such an internal commitment device and ask how an individual can use it to
regulate behavior. These papers thus are similar to our approach. Benhabib and Bisin
study a consumption saving model, in which an individual may invoke control processes to
inhibit automatic processes that are prone to temptation. Herweg and M¨ uller show how self-
imposed deadlines help overcome procrastination. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and B´ enabou
and Tirole (2002) show that a hyperbolic discounting agent may rationally avoid information,
because extra knowledge may move beliefs to a range where ineﬃcient procrastination occurs.
2 Model
We consider the behavior of an individual with present-biased preferences who faces a self-
control problem. At date 1, the individual chooses the eﬀort to put into completing a task.
The costs of eﬀort are immediate, whereas the outcome (and the utility related to the out-
come) realize only one period later, at date 2. When making the eﬀort decision at date 1,
the individual overemphasizes the immediate costs relative to the more distant beneﬁt of a
good task performance because he has a present bias. This bias can create an intrapersonal
conﬂict of interest. At date 0, the individual may think that working hard on the task is
4There is also a growing empirical literature on this topic. For example, Gine, Karlan, and Zinman
(2008) examine the eﬀects of a commitment contract for smokers. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) study the
eﬀects of a commitment savings product in the Philippines. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) design a savings
product allowing costumers to commit to higher future savings. Newton et al. (1998) show that consumers
strategically ration their purchase quantities of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse. Ariely and
Wertenbroch (2002) study the eﬀects of deadlines on procrastination.
5The economists Ian Ayres, Dean Karlan and Jonathan Goldberg turned this idea into the website
stickK.com. It allows people to make promises to relatives or friends, who are supposed to enforce these
commitment contracts which put reputation or money at stake.
5optimal. But then he might shirk once he makes the eﬀort choice at date 1. To regulate his
behavior at date 1, the individual can set at date 0 a goal that serves as a reference point
for the future outcome.
The task. At date 1, the individual has to complete a task which requires him to put in
some level of eﬀort e ∈ {e, ¯ e}. While high eﬀort causes an immediate utility cost (c(¯ e) ≡ c),
low eﬀort causes no disutility (c(e) = 0). Only one period later, at date 2, the task outcome
y ∈ [0, ¯ y] and any beneﬁts arising from it realize. The task outcome depends stochastically on
the individual’s eﬀort choice e according to the conditional distribution F(y|e), with density
f(y|e) > 0 ∀y ∈ [0, ¯ y]. High eﬀort raises the outcome in the sense of strict ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance:
Assumption 1 F(y|¯ e) < F(y|e) ∀y ∈ (0, ¯ y).
Goal setting. At date 0, the individual chooses a goal a, which then becomes anchored his
head as a standard for the future outcome y to be achieved. The assumption that an indi-
vidual has the capacity to set goals for himself that remain meaningful over time is grounded
in the psychology literature. For example, Gollwitzer (1999) writes: “By forming goal in-
tentions, people translate their noncommittal desires into binding goals. The consequence
of having formed a goal intention is a sense of commitment that obligates the individual to
realize the goal.” One of the ﬁndings in the psychology literature however is that such goals
cannot be arbitrarily set, but must be “realistic” (see e.g. Locke and Latham 1990b). To
capture bounds on goal setting imposed by Nature, we require that a ∈ [0, ¯ y]. That is, the
goal level must correspond to a possible outcome of the task.
There is extensive psychological evidence that people experience a loss if they fall short of
a goal and a gain if they exceed it. The losses loom larger than gains of equal size. For
example, Bandura (1989, p.1180) summarizes that “people seek self-satisfactions from ful-
ﬁlling valued goals” and experience “discontent with substandard performances” (see also
the introduction). We capture this with a value function in the spirit of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979): depending on the diﬀerence between the outcome realization y and the
goal a, the individual experiences a psychological gain µ+(y − a) from satisfying the goal
if y ≥ a, and a psychological loss µ−(a − y) from falling short of the goal if y < a. Fol-
lowing K¨ oszegi and Rabin’s (2006) recent application of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
gain-loss utility framework to psychological utility, we assume that the individual exhibits
linear loss aversion: µ+(y−a) = max{y−a,0} and µ−(y−a) = µ×max{a−y,0}, with µ > 1.
Present bias. The individual has time-inconsistent preferences in the sense of Strotz (1955).
A present bias causes current payoﬀs to be more salient than future payoﬀs. Following
the literature (e.g. Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a),
we model this using (β,δ)-preferences (or quasi-hyperbolic discounting). At date t, the
6individual discounts a future payoﬀ at date t + s (s ≥ 1) at rate β δs. The parameter δ
corresponds to the standard exponential discount factor. For β = 1, the individual thus
behaves as in a standard time-consistent discounting framework. For β < 1 the individual
has a present bias, because the current period is overweighted relative to future periods. As
β is the parameter of interest, without loss of generality, we will assume that δ = 1. Hence,
the expected utility of the individual at date t ∈ {0,1}, Ut, is given by:
U0 = u0 + β E[u1 + u2],
U1 = u1 + β E[u2],
where ut is the instantaneous utility in period t. While the incarnation of the individual at
date 0 (self 0) weighs future utilities u1 and u2 equally, his date-1 incarnation (self 1) puts
a larger relative weight on u1 if β < 1.
At date 0, the individual chooses his goal level and no payoﬀ-relevant events occur (u0 = 0).
Date-1 utility reﬂects the immediate cost of eﬀort exerted on the task: u1 = −c(e). At date
2, the individual experiences utility related to the realized task outcome:
u2(y,a) = v(y) + [max{y − a,0} − µ × max{a − y,0}].
It consists of two parts:6 First, a consumption utility or instrumental utility component,
v(y) (v(y)0 > 0 and v(y)00 < 0). This corresponds to the traditional outcome-based utility
in economic models. Second, the psychological utility component introduced above, which
depends on the diﬀerence between the outcome realization y and the goal a.7
3 Analysis
3.1 Intrapersonal conﬂicts of interest
To understand why and how goals may act as a positive motivator, we show ﬁrst when a
conﬂict of interest between self 0 (the date-0 incarnation of the individual) and self 1 (the
date-1 incarnation of the individual) arises in the absence of a positive goal level. For self
0 the choice of eﬀort still lies in the future, and he therefore weighs equally the eﬀort costs
and the potential future beneﬁts related to the task outcome. High eﬀort is optimal from his
perspective if the expected utility it yields (β {E[v(y)|¯ e] + E[y|¯ e] − c}) exceeds that from
6For terminology see K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2006).
7Psychological utility is here deﬁned over outcomes and not over actions (a similar approach is e.g. taken
by Rayo and Becker 2007). This is analogous to the traditional outcome-based utility setting, in which people
also care about outcomes rather than actions. Such a formulation arises naturally if there is uncertainty
about the ‘right’ type of action to take, because not all possible future circumstances are known or can be
described ex ante. However, similar arguments as outlined in the following would apply if we assumed that
the psychological utility was deﬁned over actions and people set goals for actions.
7low eﬀort (β {E[v(y)|e] + E[y|e]}). That is, he wants his future self to work hard if and only
if
β {∆E[v(y)] + ∆E[y] − c} ≥ 0, (1)
where ∆E[v(y)] ≡ E[v(y)|¯ e] − E[v(y)|e] and ∆E[y] ≡ E[y|¯ e] − E[y|e] denote the expected
gains in instrumental utility and psychological utility, respectively.
Only in the case with no present bias (β = 1) does self 1 always choose exactly as self 0
would. Self 1 however overemphasizes immediate costs and rewards because β < 1. As a
result, self 1 may prefer to shirk, while self 0 wants self 1 to work hard. To see this formally,
note that for self 1 it is optimal to provide low eﬀort if and only if
β {∆E[v(y)] + ∆E[y]} − c < 0. (2)
Thus, whenever both (1) and (2) hold, there is a conﬂict of interest between self 0 and self
1 (this is often referred to as a self-control problem in the behavioral economics literature).
This leads to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 There is an intrapersonal conﬂict of interest, i.e. the individual faces a self-
control problem, if and only if:
c
β
> ∆E[v(y)] + ∆E[y] > c. (CoI)
The condition (CoI) implies the existence of a threshold β1 = c
∆E[v(y)]+∆E[y] for a conﬂict of
interest to arise: for a mild present bias, β ≥ β1 there is no intrapersonal conﬂict of interest.
However, with a more severe bias, β < β1 there is a self-control problem.
3.2 ‘Do-your-best’ goals and na¨ ıvet´ e about own present bias
Before discussing how people set speciﬁc goals to motivate themselves, we brieﬂy want to
ask whether a much simpler ‘do-your-best’ goal can also serve as a source of motivation.
Here self 0 simply tells self 1 to do his best, without specifying a concrete positive goal level
a. In response, self 1 indeed does what is best for him and maximizes utility from his date-1
perspective. But whenever Condition (CoI) holds, the best eﬀort choice of self 1 does not
match the best eﬀort choice from the perspective of self 0. Thus, such a goal is as good as no
goal, and fails to address intrapersonal conﬂicts of interest. While the argument is simple, it
helps understand the evidence from the psychology literature that ‘do-your-best’ goals often
fail to motivate people and tend to lead to low performance (e.g. Locke and Latham 1990a).
Lemma 1 ‘Do-your-best’ goals fail to motivate high eﬀort if there is an intrapersonal conﬂict
of interest, i.e. if Condition (CoI) holds.
8Why do people nevertheless set ‘do-your-best’ goals that do not help overcome self-control
problems? Setting such goals comes at no costs (they are not painful, in contrast to the
speciﬁc goals that we consider in the next section). Also, individuals often are not fully
aware of their time-inconsistent preferences, i.e. are na¨ ıve in the sense of O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a). Self 0 may think that self 1 attaches the same relative weights to future
outcomes as he does today. In such cases, self 0 believes that the optimal eﬀort choice from
his perspective corresponds to the best eﬀort choice that self 1 will make.
3.3 Speciﬁc goals as a source of motivation
We now move to the goal setting problem for an individual who is aware of his present
bias and correctly anticipates his future behavior, i.e. who is sophisticated in the sense of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). To analyze this problem we start with the eﬀort choice
made by the incarnation of the individual at date 1, and ask how self 1 responds to a speciﬁc
goal a. We then determine by backward induction the optimal goal that self 0 will set.
Given the goal a, self 1 decides on his eﬀort e ∈ {e, ¯ e}, maximizing his expected utility
U1(e|a;β) ≡ −c(e) + β

E[v(y)|¯ e] + µ
Z a
0
(y − a)f(y|¯ e)dy +
Z ¯ y
a
(y − a)f(y|¯ e)dy

. (3)
High eﬀort (e = ¯ e) is optimal for self 1 if only if the expected gain in date-2 utility (discounted
by the present-bias parameter β) outweighs the immediate cost of eﬀort. In other words,
the following ‘incentive constraint’ must be satisﬁed:
Φ(a;β) ≡ U1(¯ e|a;β) − U1(e|a;β) ≥ 0. (4)
As we show in the appendix, the left hand side is increasing in the goal level a, i.e.
∂Φ(a;β)
∂a > 0. Thus, a ‘diﬃcult goal’ is a better motivator than an ‘easy goal’. This might
seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, because a higher goal also raises the chance that the individ-
ual ends up falling short of the aspired level a, even though he worked hard. However, the
incentive constraint tells us that the individual is even more likely to fall short of the goal
a if self 1 shirks. This is the channel through which a higher (more diﬃcult) goal increases
the incentives to work hard. We summarize this in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Goals that specify a speciﬁc aspiration level for the outcome increase the motiva-




In numerous studies of how exogenously given goals aﬀect task performance, psychologists
indeed document that ‘diﬃcult’ goals induce better outcomes than ‘easy’ goals, or the ab-
sence of any goal (see e.g. the survey by Locke and Latham 1990a). Our above result
matches this pattern by formalizing the psychological loss-aversion mechanism proposed by
9psychologists for the functioning of goals.
Because a higher goal increases the motivation of self 1 to provide eﬀort (Lemma 2), it can
serve as a tool for self-regulation and potentially help get around intrapersonal conﬂicts of
interest. How does the goal required for self-regulation relate to the extent of the individual’s
present bias? All else equal, a lower β, i.e. a more severe present bias, reduces the incentives
for self 1 to provide eﬀort. Self 0 can counteract a lack in motivation arising from this with
a more diﬃcult goal. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the goal level that
is necessary to motivate self 1 in the presence of a conﬂict of interest, and the severity of
the present bias. To see this formally, denote by ˆ a the minimum goal level that makes the
incentive constraint (4) hold with equality: Φ(ˆ a;β) = 0. The following lemma shows how ˆ a
varies with the severity of the present bias, captured by the parameter β:
Lemma 3 Suppose an individual faces an intrapersonal conﬂict of interest, i.e. Condition
(CoI) holds. Then, the more severe the present bias (i.e. the lower β), the higher the goal
level ˆ a that is required to motivate self 1 to exert high eﬀort, i.e. ∂ˆ a
∂β > 0. If the present bias
is too strong (β < β) no ‘realistic’ goal (a ∈ [0, ¯ y]) can help get around the intrapersonal





The result shows that an individual needs to respond to a more severe self-control problem
with a more ambitious goal to motivate his future self. The scope for this however has its
limits, because according to the evidence from the psychology literature only ‘realistic’ goals
lead to the psychological gain-loss eﬀects at the heart of our model. But these limits on
goal setting are not the constraints that prevent an individual from self-regulating. Instead,
limits arise endogenously from goal being painful self-disciplining devices as we show in the
next section, where we ask about possible costs from goal setting.
3.4 Goals are painful self-discipling devices
Faced with a self-control problem, self 0 may attempt to motivate his future self to choose
high eﬀort by setting himself a goal a. To see the possible costs from setting such a goal,
suppose that the future eﬀort level e was ﬁxed (i.e. independent of the chosen goal) and








(y − a)f(y|e)dy +
Z ¯ y
a
(y − a)f(y|e)dy − c(e)

. (5)
Holding the eﬀort level e ﬁxed, a higher goal increases the chance of falling short of the
aspired outcome a. This weighs more heavily than the chance of exceeding a, because losses
loom larger than gains of equal size (µ > 1). An increase in the goal level therefore has
10a direct negative eﬀect on the expected utility for self 0. As the psychologists Locke and
Latham (1990a, p.79) put it: “raising the goal level simply shifts the valence function to
a higher plane; the individual must do more for less.” A higher goal level thus is painful
because it reduces the expected utility resulting from a given eﬀort level.
Lemma 4 Goals are painful self-disciplining devices:
∂U0(a|e)
∂a < 0.
So the purpose of setting a > 0 is to discipline self 1 to put in more eﬀort than he would
exert in the absence of a positive goal. An individual faced with an intrapersonal conﬂict
of interest therefore needs to determine in a ﬁrst step the minimum goal level ˆ a required to
motivate self 1 to work hard. In a second step, self 0 then weighs the expected gains from
higher eﬀort by self 1 against the direct negative impact on self 0’s expected utility from the
goal ˆ a. In other words, self 0’s expected utility with goal ˆ a and high eﬀort in the future has
to exceed the utility from low eﬀort in the future and a = 0:
U0(ˆ a|¯ e) ≥ U0(0|e). (6)
Lemma 3 showed that the required goal for self regulation increases with the severity of the
present bias. But a higher goal is also more painful, making it less likely that Condition (6)
is satisﬁed. So will an individual with an intrapersonal conﬂict of interest (β < β1) ever set
a positive goal for himself? And does the constraint that goals have to be realistic ever bind
and prevent self-regulation? Clearly, the more important the gain in instrumental utility
∆E[v(y)] is, the more likely it is that (6) holds, and the lower β from Lemma 3. It is thus
illuminating to study the above questions for the case where ∆E[v(y)] = 0, because this
reduces to a minimum the scope and desirability of self-regulation through goal setting. The
next proposition summarizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the task oﬀers potential psychological rewards exceeding the
cost of eﬀort (∆E[y] > c), but no additional instrumental utility (v(y) = 0). Then,
i) if the individual has no intrapersonal conﬂict of interest (β ≥ β1), self 0 sets no goal
(a = 0) or a ‘do-your-best’ goal, and self 1 exerts high eﬀort, where β1 ≡ c/∆E[y].
ii) there exists a cutoﬀ β0 satisfying 1
µ β1 < β0 < β1, such that for β ∈ (β0,β1) self 0 sets a
speciﬁc goal (a > 0) and self 1 provides high eﬀort.
iii) if 1
µ β1 ≤ β < β0, self 0 sets a = 0 and self 1 provides low eﬀort, even though there exist
‘realistic goal levels a ∈ (0, ¯ y] that would motivate self 1 to exert high eﬀort.
iv) if β < 1
µ β1, self-regulation is not possible because there exists no ‘realistic goal level that
motivates self 1 to exert high eﬀort; this however is never a binding constraint.
11The ﬁrst part of the proposition is straightforward: there is no reason to set a painful goal
if there is no self-control problem to solve. If however faced with an intrapersonal conﬂict of
interest, self 0 weighs the beneﬁts of self-regulation against the expected psychological costs.
Goals that motivate self 1 to work hard pay oﬀ if the present bias is not too severe (β ≥ β0).
For this parameter range, the required goal is suﬃciently low so that the expected gains
from working hard and achieving the goal not only outweigh the expected losses from falling
short of it, but also make the self-set goal more attractive than the alternative of having no
goal and living with self 1 shirking.
For a stronger present bias, which is not so severe that self-regulation no longer would be
feasible (β ∈ [β1/µ,β0]), motivating self 1 to work hard requires a very ambitious goal. This
leaves only a small chance of obtaining psychological satisfaction from exceeding the goal,
but a high chance of not meeting the aspired outcome level and suﬀering a psychological
loss, which also hurts self 0. Hence, self 0 prefers not to impose these psychological costs
on himself, even though they would allow him to get around his self-control problem and
motivate self 1 to work hard.
For β < β1/µ, no admissible goal would motivate self 1 to work hard. However, the constraint
that goals have to be ‘realistic’ is not what keeps the individual from engaging in self-
regulation, as the preceding argument showed. Limits on self-regulation through goal setting
arise because goals are painful self-disciplining devices. Individuals with a severe present bias
therefore rationally choose not to set tough goals for themselves, even if this were feasible,
and rather give up on self-regulation.
Thus, in terms of goal setting, sophisticated individuals with a severe present bias behave
like people without a self-control problem (i.e. people with a mild or no present bias) or
na¨ ıve individuals: they choose no goal. But while people without a self-control problem will
work hard once faced with the task, people with a severe present bias will shirk – as will
those who abstained from goal setting out of na¨ ıvet´ e.
For the case where the task outcome also provides an instrumental utility gain ∆E[v(y)]
there are two eﬀects. First, the range of parameters β for which an intrapersonal conﬂict
of interest exists is smaller (i.e. β1 is lower). Second, if a self-control problem exists, self-
regulation is less painful, so a positive goal is more likely to be optimal (pushing β0 down).
Thus, our model predicts that additional instrumental utility gains ∆E[v(y)] related to the
task outcome can play a particularly important role for people with severe time-inconsistency
problems. In the absence of these gains they would otherwise not set goals for themselves
and give up on self-regulation.
Next to direct beneﬁts from a good performance (like improved health from a weight loss,
better chances for a job with good grades), instrumental utility gains might also encompass
monetary incentives, or concerns for reputation. For example, the success of schemes such
12as e.g. Weight Watchers relies on concerns for reputation that arise from peer pressure when
goals are publicly announced. Regarding monetary incentives, Locke and Latham (1990b,
p.240) observe that “[m]onetary incentives strengthen goal commitment, providing people
value money, the amount of money is suﬃciently large and the incentives are not tied to
goals perceived as impossible”. Commitment contracts are another example of shaping the
instrumental utility related to task outcomes with the help of monetary incentives. One
common form of such agreements are bets that a certain outcome will be achieved. To
provide a tool for engaging in such commitment contracts, the economists Ian Ayres, Dean
Karlan and Jonathan Goldberg recently designed the website StickK.com. It allows an
individual to specify a goal (e.g. lose 5kg of weight), a penalty for not reaching it (e.g.
donate EUR1,000 to charity X), and to designate a person who both veriﬁes whether this
goal was achieved and enforces the penalty.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the process of self-regulation through self-set goals. We model an indi-
vidual with a present bias that causes a self-control problem and show that he can enhance
his motivation to work hard in the future by raising the goal against which performance will
be measured. A challenging goal increases the psychological cost of shirking because the
individual suﬀers a loss from falling short of the goal. A premise of our model is that people
have the capacity to set goals for themselves that remain meaningful over time – a fact that is
well documented in the psychology literature. What our model shows is that such goals help
some people to engage in self-regulation. However, there are limits to self-regulation even if
an individual can commit to his goal: Because goals are painful self-disciplining devices, the




The incentive constraint for self 1 (4) can be rewritten as
β

∆E[v(y)] + ∆E[y] + (µ − 1)
Z a
0
y [f(y|¯ e) − f(y|e)] dy + a [F(a|e) − F(a|¯ e)]

≥ c. (7)
The higher the goal a, the more likely it is that the incentive constraint is satisﬁed:
∂ Φ(a;β)
∂ a
= β (µ − 1) [F(a|e) − F(a|¯ e)] > 0 ∀a ∈ (0, ¯ y), (8)
by Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.
As β < 1 it follows from Condition (CoI) and (8) that ˆ a > 0. The binding incentive




∆E[v(y)] + ∆E[y] + (µ − 1)
R ˆ a
0 y [f(y|¯ e) − f(y|e)] dy + ˆ a [F(ˆ a|e) − F(ˆ a|¯ e)]

(µ − 1) [F(ˆ a|e) − F(ˆ a|¯ e)]
< 0,
for ˆ a ∈ (0, ¯ y). For the second part, evaluate the binding incentive constraint (7) at the
maximum admissible goal level ¯ y and rearrange terms.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Holding eﬀort constant and diﬀerentiating Equation (5) with respect to a gives
∂ U0(a|e)
∂ a
= −[1 + (µ − 1)F(a|e)] < 0.
Combining this insight with Lemma 2 yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 1.
i) From Lemma 4 we know that self 0 never sets a in excess of the level ˆ a required to
incentivize his future self. Denote by β1 the value of the present-bias parameter β for which,
given a = 0, self 1 would be just indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort or not. Condition (CoI)
and ∆E[v(y)] = 0 imply that β1 ≡ c/∆E[y]. The result follows because ˆ a decreases with β
(Lemma 3).
iv) Follows from Lemma 3, as ∆E[v(y)] = 0 implies that β = 1
µ β1.
ii) and iii) We have U0(0|¯ e) − U0(0|e) > 0 because ∆E[y] > c. Moreover,
U0(¯ y|¯ e) − U0(0|e) = β {µ [E(y|¯ e) − ¯ y] − E(y|e) − c} < 0.
From the proof of Lemma 4 it follows that U0(a|¯ e) − U0(0|e) is a continuous and strictly
decreasing function. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique value
14a0 ∈ (0, ¯ y) such that U0(a0|¯ e) − U0(0|e) = 0. This is the maximum goal level that self 0
would ever choose to get self 1 to exert high eﬀort.
The next argument shows that there exists a β0 ∈ (β,β1) such that self 1’s incentive con-
straint holds at a0. We make use of Φa > 0 (see Equation (8)). From i) we know that self
1’s incentive constraint (4) binds at β1 and a = 0: Φ(0;β1,0) = 0. So, Φ(a0;β1,0) > 0.
Similarly, from Lemma 3 we know that Φ(¯ y;β,0) = 0, so Φ(a0;β,0) < 0. Using Φβ > 0, by
the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique β0 ∈ (β,β1) such that Φ(a0;β0,0) = 0.
Thus, β0 is the minimum value of the present-bias parameter β for which self 0 would set a
goal to incentivize self 1.
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